Two Conference Presentations!

I offered two conference presentations at the Psychology and the Other Conference in Boston from October 6-8, 2023. It was a busy weekend but great conversations were had. My book was also sold at the conference. Here is a picture of me with my book at the book table.

My first paper was titled, “Practical Considerations for Schizophrenia, Major Depressive Disorder and Bipolar I Disorder: Drawn from Phenomenological Experiences and Historical Structures.” It was based on Chapter 8, the last chapter in my book.

Abstract:

Many agree that philosophy can contribute theoretically to a better understanding of mental health, but can it practically help practitioners? Without denying the benefits to a theoretical framework, my explicit goal in this paper is to provide practical tools that arise out of philosophy in order to better address three disorders: schizophrenia, major depressive disorder and bipolar I disorder. I discover these tools by bringing together two philosophical perspectives: an analysis of individual experience (using a phenomenological approach) and an analysis of historical background (using an archaeological approach). The phenomenological perspective will be guided by French philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the archaeological perspective will be directed by French philosopher, Michel Foucault.

Beginning with schizophrenia, I will demonstrate how an experience of a hallucination comes from a nonrational behavior that is shared both in hallucinations and perceptions. This shared behavior is often overlooked due to the unspoken cultural structure that labels signs of nonrationality as moral failure. What we will find is that, even though there is no longer an explicit moral condemnation of schizophrenia today, the past and present historical structures help us identify one source for unexplained feelings of guilt experienced by many patients.

In regard to major depressive disorder, I will trace the structures of the world, such as spatial and temporal structures, that patients rely on in their state of sadness, to both understand their condition and secure a path forward. We will learn that the structures that patients depend on are not just bodily structures, but also cultural perceptions of depression which have changed over time. Surprisingly, these changes are not always due to observations of the disorder but are constructed to satisfy prior qualitative systems.

For bipolar I disorder, I will map the experience of a manic episode onto a spectrum of space centeredness. Although manic episodes demonstrate an extreme relation to space, we will find that usual human experiences are based on the same patterns of “lived space” which can range from decentered to overly-centered perceptions of objective space. Due to the variety in manifestations of this disorder, a cultural analysis encourages practitioners to treat a diagnosis of bipolar as a descriptive interpretation rather than an explanation.

The motivation behind these descriptions is to give a fuller — more human picture — to experiences of illness. From his decades of work in psychiatry, Arthur Kleinman writes that practitioners must consider the “illness” of a patient, which is the “innately human experience of symptoms and suffering,” in addition to the “disease,” which only includes the ordering of theories about a disorder.(fn) Following Kleinman’s appeal, this paper helps us see illness “as important as disease” by investigating an individual’s experience of a disease and the placement of that disease in our historical context.(fn) Although the applications offered in this paper by no means replace the medical accounts, they supplement them by grounding these disorders in the wider frame of our humanness.

My second paper was titled, “No Longer Foreign: Four Phenomenological Principles Drawn from Disability Studies.” This paper came out of my class that I taught in Spring 2023 on the Philosophy of Disability.

It is a common misconception that an analysis of abnormal behavior gives us insight into normal behavior by means of contrast. In other words, we may think that if we identify the defects and problems in abnormal behavior, we can then find the opposite to be true in normal behavior. Readers of phenomenological literature can sometimes be confused by the frequent discussion of disabilities and assume that these accounts are there to demonstrate the lack of something that is then present in those without disabilities. While phenomenology does not want to do away with distinctions entirely between the normal and abnormal, its purpose in addressing disability is precisely the reverse: a phenomenological account of disability gives us insight into human behavior — not because it is foreign — but because it reveals what is shared in all human experience. In fact, it is sometimes in the so-called abnormal behavior and experiences that we are best able to identify the fundamental human ways of encountering the world.

This paper would like to contribute to the growing discussion in phenomenology that exposes these shared human patterns by exploring one area in particular of disability studies: the bodily process of adaptation and learning for those with disabilities. I will argue that as we explore the experiences described here, we will find four common principles which apply to general human adaptation and learning. First, in consideration of cases of blindness, deafness and depression, we will see how humans rely on our bodies to take in the world. Second, in reviewing cases of spinal cord injury, we will find that the development of habits is through a gradual movement from the “I cannot” to the “I can.” Third, analyzing the use of technology for mobility, such as a wheelchair, we will discover how we all incorporate instruments into our experience of the world. And fourth, by looking at experiences in disability sports, we will discuss how we all receive satisfaction in healthy bodily activities.

The motivation behind the accounts in this paper is to bridge the gap between a disabled and non-disabled way of learning about the world. This is not to diminish the great achievements made by those who have had to adapt to challenging disabilities, but to humanize all ways of learning and adapting. In this way, we can relate and support one another in all manners of bodily experiences.

In terms of sources, the disability cases will be drawn from Berger and Wilber’s Introducing Disability Studies as well as other individual studies done on rehabilitation and recovery. The phenomenological approach for considering the cases will be drawn from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea and Being and Nothingness.

Seminar Presentation: Revelation in Suffering: The Merits of a Phenomenological Approach

I was accepted to participate in a Seminar and Conference this summer on Phenomenology and Revelation. It was an amazing 10 days at a retreat center in Long Island, New York with excellent presentations and deep conversations.

Here is a picture of the sunset at the retreat center overlooking the bay.

Abstract: No matter what angle we try, whether it is philosophical, theological or even practical, it is very difficult to make sense of suffering. Easy answers may suffice at first, but once we walk through a tragedy of our own or are exposed to some real suffering in the wider world, we are no longer satisfied and are compelled to search for something better. Although many perspectives can aid us in this, phenomenology offers a response to suffering that actually takes into account the magnitude and depth of the experience. This is because a phenomenological approach demonstrates concretely — not abstractly — how revelation is experienced in the midst of suffering in ways other approaches cannot do. More often, we focus on how revelation is something given prior to suffering in order to aid us in enduring it such as the promise of the land that the Israelites were given before they had to wander in the desert for forty years. Or we may think of revelation as a reward given after suffering such as the blessings that Odysseus receives after his long faithful journey through many hardships to return to his family. While these are important contributions to understanding revelation and suffering, phenomenology takes a radical stance by designating suffering as a mode of revelation itself. To illustrate this, I will first offer a phenomenological sketch of suffering, next describe what kind of revelation is available in suffering and conclude by arguing for the merits of drawing on phenomenology to establish the unique role that revelation plays in suffering.

Article Published: Miracle in Myth: Nietzsche on Wunder

I am happy to announce that my article on Nietzsche and miracle has been published! It was published in the journal Religions and is part of a special issue on “The Intersection of Phenomenology and Religion.” You can see it online here and download a pdf.

I am also putting a pdf of it here.


Here is the abstract:

This paper considers the experience of miracle through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Although he is often considered an anti-religious thinker, I argue that Nietzsche actually puts forth a positive conception of miracle because of its indispensable role in the creation of myth. I walk through Nietzsche’s texts to describe his account of miracle (Wunder) and to demonstrate how it reveals a phenomenological perspective on miracle by placing it and rooting it in human life. Despite his rejection of traditional religion, Nietzsche reminds us that miracles are not an anomaly to human experience, but rather they are the way in which humans are able to embrace and affirm life through participation in myth.

Conference Presentation: Reimagining the Relationship between Suffering and Disability with Merleau-Ponty and Kierkegaard

I had the opportunity to present at the International Merleau-Ponty Circle in Washington D.C. on November 11, 2022. I was so excited that the theme of the conference was disability. The conference was titled: FITS AND MISFITS: RETHINKING DISABILITY, DEBILITY, AND THE WORLD WITH MERLEAU-PONTY.

Here is an abstract of my paper:

Equating the experience of suffering with the experience of disability runs contrary not only to a general understanding of human life, but also to a thoughtful approach to disability. To assume that disability is the same as suffering is certainly to misunderstand disability, as many others have shown. But, as I will argue, to assume that disability is the same as suffering is also to misunderstand suffering. Could it be that our incorrect view of suffering impacts the way that we see disability? I propose that, in order to understand the role that suffering may play in disability, we need to rethink what we mean by suffering and what kind of suffering could be present in disability.

To do so, I will briefly present some of the difficulties — philosophical, social, and practical — that are found in even discussing a relationship between suffering and disability. Second, drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Kierkegaard, I will argue for an expanded view of suffering where the good of suffering is not found in a future result, but in its placement in the present world and in its manifestation of joy in the present moment. Third, I will apply this expanded notion of suffering to disability in order to suggest what a reimagined relationship might look like between disability and suffering. While this new relationship is not meant to be universal nor comprehensive for all areas of disability, it does provide a helpful vocabulary that adds to a rich phenomenological account of disability.

Conference Presentation: A Merleau-Pontian Reading of Aristotle’s Notion of Form in ‘Book Z’ of the Metaphysics

I had the opportunity to present for the first time at the Northern Plains Philosophy Conference at North Dakota State University on April 2, 2022.

Here is my abstract:

I believe that Merleau-Ponty’s unique approach to the notion of form offers a fresh perspective that will reinforce and bring credibility to Aristotle’s account. Coming from a psychological and phenomenological angle, Merleau-Ponty argues for the necessity of form in his first major work, The Structure of Behavior. Although his path toward defining form differs from Aristotle’s metaphysical path, Merleau-Ponty argues, like Aristotle, that the notion of form is what provides intelligibility to the world around us. 

In this paper, we will focus on the description of form in chapters 10 and 17 of Book Z of Aristotle’s Metaphysicsand look at the evidence for this idea of form in Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior. This is not to say that Merleau-Ponty is purposely writing to verify Aristotle’s account, for he does not explicitly relate his analysis to Aristotle. And though he was most likely exposed to Aristotelianism, particularly Scholastic and Renaissance Aristotelianism, through his study of the Rationalists, he appears more interested in engaging with other schools of thought and rarely mentions Aristotle or his works. Nevertheless, a reader of Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior, who is familiar with Aristotle’s description of form, cannot ignore the unmistakable parallels between their two accounts. 

We will begin by considering the question (aporia), which I will call the “problem of parts,” that both Aristotle and Merleau-Ponty are concerned with and which ultimately leads them to posit the notion of form. Second, we will examine Aristotle’s metaphysical description of form in chapters 10 and 17 of Book Z of the Metaphysics. As we make our way through the text, I will link Aristotle’s senses of form with Merleau-Ponty’s senses of form which he gathers from his studies on animal and human behavior. 

To those who are concerned that Aristotle’s notion of form is no longer relevant or applicable, this paper advances that Merleau-Ponty’s re-imagining of form both defends Aristotle’s metaphysical explanations while, at the same time, extends them into pertinent areas of ethical interest.